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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BERTHA M. McCLURE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
EDWIN E. DOWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10042

BRIEF O·F RESPO·NDENT

Appeal from the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County, Utah
Hon. A. H. Ellett, District Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. This appeal presents the question as to whether or
not in an action under the Utah Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act to collect past-due installments
of child support, which have accrued pursuant to an unmodified Alabama divorce decree, the accrued installments are entitled to full faith and c·redit under the United
States Constitution or can be canceled or reduced by the
Utah Courts because the defendant's visitation rights, pursuant to a separation agreement, have been violated.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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b. The lower court held that the violation of the
defendant's visitation rights was not a valid legal defense
and entered judgment for the net amount of the unpaid
arrcarages plus interest at the legal rate.
c. The respondent essentially agrees with the facts
as stated by the appellant, but believes they should be
supplemented as follows:
(1) The decree of absolute divorce entered on February 6, 1957, by the Circuit Court of Russell County,
Alabama, has never been modified by order of any court.
(Tr. 20)

(2) ) The decree of divorce awarded custody of the
two minor children to the plaintiff, and ordered the defendant to pay for their support the sum of $150.00 each
month. (Exh. D-1)
(3) The decree of divorce does not refer to or incorporate any of the provisions of the separation agreement
entered into between the parties on January 24, 1957.
(Exh. D-2; Tr. 19)
4. The decree of divorce makes no mention whatsoever with respect to any visitation rights of the father.
(Exh. D-1)

( 5) The defendant resided in Utah during the time
when the child support payments accrued. (Tr. 20; App.
Br. 5)
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS WHICH
HAVE ACCRUED PURSUANT TO AN UNMODIFIED ALABAMA DIVORCE DECREE ARE
CONSIDERED FINAL AND VESTED AND ARE
PROTECTED FROM ANY REDUCTION BY THE
COURTS OF A SISTER STATE BY THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
POINT II
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PAST-DUE INSTALLMENTS OF CHILD SUPPORT ARE NOT
PROTECTED BY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE, THE VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S
VISITATION RIGHTS DOES NO·T LEGALLY EXCUSE OR DISCHARGE HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY
ACCRUED CHILD SUPPO·RT.
POINT III
INTEREST O·N PAST-DUE INSTALLMENTS OF
CHILD SUPPORT ACCUMULATES UNTIL THE
ARREARAGES ARE PAID.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS WHICH
HAVE ACCRUED PURSUANT TO AN UNSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~lODIFIED

ALABAMA DIVORCE DECREE ARE
CONSIDERED FINAL AND VESTED AND ARE
PROTECTED FROM ANY REDUCTION BY THE
COURTS OF A SISTER STATE BY THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
The full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution provides in part:
uFull Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records and judicial
Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const. Art
IV, Sec. I.
Pursuant to this clause, the United States Congress
has enacted a statute which provides that the judicial
proceedings of the court of any state ((shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 USCA 1738, 62
Stat. 947 ( 1948)
The appellant evidently assumes that the full faith
and credit clause is inapplicable to the present case because the past-due installments of child support had not
been reduced to judgment in Alabama. This erroneous
assumption is made without reference or citation to any
statute or case law. (App. Br. 7, 8)
The United States Supreme Court in Sistare vs.
Sistare, 218 US 1, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905 (1910),
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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held that past-due installments of alimony or child support, when they are considered final and unmodifiable by
the state originally entering the degree, are protected by
the full faith and credit clause regardless of whether or
not such installments have been reduced to a final
judgment.
In the Sistare case, the plaintiff, by the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, was granted a separation
from bed and board from her husband, and the defendant
was ordered to pay the sum of $22.50 per week for the
support of herself and the maintenance and education of
their minor child. No payments were made by the defendant. Five years later the wife commenced an action
in Connecticut to recover the amount then in arrears.
The arrearages had not been reduced to final judgment
in New York. The court held on page 91 0-11 :
((First, that, generally speaking, where a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in
future instalments, the right to such instalments
becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due,
and is therefore protected by the full faith and
credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of the
instalments, since, as declared in the Barber Case,
(alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce of separation from bed and boa,rd is as much a debt of
record, until the decree has been recalled, as any
other judgment for money is.' Second, that this
general rule, however, does not obtain where, by
the law of the state in which a judgment for future
alimony is rendered, the right to demand and receive such future alimony is discretionary with the
court which rendered the decree, to such an extent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that no absolute or vested right attaches to receive
the instalments ordered by the decree to be paid,
even although no application to annul or modify
the decree in respect to alimony had been made
prior to the instalments becoming due.
ult follows, therefore, from the statement
which we have made of the case, that the New
York judgment which was relied upon came within
the general rule, and, therefore, that the action of
the supreme court of errors of Connecticut in refusing to enforce it was in conflict with the full
faith and credit clause, unless it be, as a result of the
law of the state of New York, the judgment for
future alimony in that state, even as to past-due
instalments, was so completely within the discretion
of the courts of that state as to bring it within the
exceptional rule embodied in the second proposition."

If there were any doubt as to the type of judgment
which the court said was entitled to full faith and credit
in the Sistare case, this was laid to rest by the Court's
statement in Barber vs. Barber, 323 US 77, 65 S. Ct. 137,
89 L. Ed. 82 ( 1944). The Supreme Court stated on
page 84:
uln Sistare vs. Sistare, supra (218 US 16, 17,
54 L. ed. 910, 911, 30 S Ct 682 28 LRA (NS)
10 6 8, 2 0 Ana Cas 10 61 ) , this Court considered
whether a decree for future alimony brought to a
sister state, was entitled to full faith and credit as

to installments which had accrued, but which had
not been reduced to a further judgment. The Court
held that a decree for future alimony is, under the
Constitution and the statute, entitled to credit as
to past-due installments, if the right to them is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(absolute and vested,' even though the decree might
be modified prospectively by future orders of the
court." (Emphasis added)
Therefore, under the Sistare and Ba.rber decisions, if
the right under Alabama law to past-due installments of
child support is ((absolute and vested," they must be given
ttfull faith and credit" and are protected from any modification or reduction by the Utah courts.
Under Alabama law, past-due installments of child
support, as they accrue, are absolutely vested and cannot
be modified or reduced by any court of law or equity.
The first Alabama case which considered this question was Armstrong vs. Green, 260 Ala. 39, 68 So.2d 834
( 19 53 ) . In this case, an Alabama court gran ted a divorce between the parties and awarded custody of the
minor child to the mother. The defendant was ordered
to pay $3 5 a month child support. The plaintiff subsequently brought a petition for a rule to show cause why
the defendant should not be held in contempt for failure
to make the monthly payments. The plaintiff contended
that the defendant was guilty of contempt and that the
accrued child support payments under the divorce decree
were vested and beyond the court's power to destroy or
release. The minor child, except for the first year after
the divorce, had been in the custody of the plaintiff's parents, who had supported the child without any expectation
or desire for reimbursement.
The Supreme Court of Alabama initially held that
since the child had been in the custody of a third person
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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who had supported the child, the mother could not recover the amounts of child support which had accrued.
1--Iowever, on rehearing, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed this position and held the father in contempt
and awarded to the mother the amount of the accrued
child support payments. The court, on rehearing, stated
at page 839:
uon application for rehearing LAWSON,
SIMPSON, GOO,DWYN, MERRILL, and CLAYTON, JJ., are of the opinion that a rehearing should
be granted, so as to reverse the holding of the lower
court on the question of contempt of Comer F.
Green. This position is based on the theory that
installment payments decreed in a divorce for support and education of the minor child of a marriage
become final judgments as of the dates due and
may be collected as other judgments. In support
of this view they cite the following authorities:
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 54 L. Ed.
905; (other citations omitted.)

* * *
uAccordingly, the decree of the lower court
is reversed and the cause remanded on that phase
of the decree of the lower court and it is held that
Comer F. Green became guilty of contempt upon
failure to comply with the decree of the court
when he failed to pay the accrued installments
provided for in the decree. The court will enter
an order giving Comer F. Green such additional
time as it deems advisable to comply with the
decree of divorce as to payments which ·are in
arrears for the maintenance and support of the
minor child, Jacqueline Green."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Wood vs. Wood, 154 So.2d 661 (Ala. 1963), the
divorce decree provided that the defendant husband pay
to the plaintiff the sum of $6 per week for the support
and maintenance of their minor child. No payments were
made after January 1, 1946. The plaintiff brought an
action to collect the arrearages which amounted to
$10,3 20. The trial court entered judgment for only
$3,477.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama, stated
on page 663:
((The question arising on this appeal can be
determined by the consideration of one issue, viz.,
does the equity court have the power to retroactively modify accrued arrearages of child support payments due under a decree of divorce a

vinculo matrimonii?
uO,ur cases clearly enunciate the rule that installment payments decreed in a divorce for support and education of the minor child of a marriage

become final judgments as of the dates due and
m.ay be collected as other judgments. Armstrong
vs. Green, 260 Ala. 39 (Rehearing Op., p. 45), 68
So.2d 834, 839. And installments which mature
before a petition to modify is filed are immune
from change. Scott vs. Scott, 265 Ala. 208, 90
So.2d 813, and cases cited. Such is the status of
the accrued weekly payments during the minority
of the child while not self-supporting."

((There is force behind the rule, since such a
decree or judgment will not be enforcible in the
Courts of our sister states unless the judgment is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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final or not subject to modification as to those
payments accrued. In other words, a judgment
subject to modification is not final, and the Courts
of a sister state are not bound to afford the judgment full faith and credit under the United States
Constitution. Green v. Green, 239 Ala. 407, 198
So. 549; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 682,
54 L. Ed. 905.
uwe are not altogether pleased with the conclusion here attained, because the facts present a
strong appeal for sympathy, but in the face of the
unswerving judicial precedents adverted to above
u.:c are left under no alternative but to order a
reversal of the decree. Perhaps the Legislature in its
wisdom might enact some remedial legislation for
future cases. This case brings squarely into focus
a probable inequity, the correction of which is
more properly addressed to the Legislature than to
the courts." (Emphasis added)
In Mel1.-'i11 vs. Purr, 155 So.2d 593, (Ala. 1963), the
divorce decree ordered the husband to pay $125 per
month to the wife for the support of their minor children.
The plaintiff brought an action to recover past-due child
support payments. The defendant contended that he had
given money directly to the children and had otherwise
expended money for their benefit in excess of the amounts
of the past-due child support payments. The trial court
sustained this defense against the wife.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, stating on
pages 594-95:
uwe are of the opinion that the court erred
in giving to the husband credit for sums not paid
to the wife."

* * *
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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((The decree is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of a decree requiring the husband
to make full payment to the wife as provided for
by the decree of divorce with performance by husband to be enforced by appropriate process of the
court."
The above decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court
make it clear that past-due installments of child support
as they accrue are absolute and are vested in the mother
and cannot be modified or reduced. The fact that payment
has been made directly to the children, or that the mother
has not had custody of the children or expended money
for their support have been rejected as defenses by the
Alabama Supreme Court. Certainly a defense based on
the violation of visitation rights contained in a prior
separation agreement, not even incorporated or referred
to by the divorce decree, would not be recognized by the
Alabama courts.
The Wood case, supra p. 9, specifically indicates
that the judicial precedents of Alabama give such accrued
installments the necessary finality to bring them within
the protection of the full faith and credit clause. If there
were any question as to the interpretation of the Alabama
law· it would have to be resolved in favor of the finality of
the accrued installments. The Supreme Court in the
Sistare case, supra p. 4, stated on page 912:
((But it is equally certain that nothing in this
language expressly gives power to revoke or modify
an installment of alimony which had accrued prior
to the making of an application to vary or modify,

and every reasonable implication must be resorted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to against the existence of such power, in the absence of clear language manifesting an intention to
confer it." (Emphasis added).
In view of the above decisions of the Alabama
Supreme Court and the standard of interpretation as set
forth in the Sistare case, the chid support payments as
they accrued under the Alabama divorce decree are :final
and vested and are protected by the full faith and credit
clause from any reduction by the Utah courts.
Contrary to the requirements of the full faith and
credit clause, the defendant erroneously contends that had
the plaintiff brought this action for arrearages in New
York, the state of her domicile, she would not have been
able to recover. In support of this contention, the defendant cites the case of Goldner vs. Goldner, 309 N.Y.
675, 128 NE 2d 321 (1955). This case does not support
this contention. The Goldner case, as indicated in the
lower court opinion, 135 NYS2d 337, 284 App. Div. 961
{1954), was an action for the enforcement of a New York
separation judgment entered prior to a Florida divorce
decree. The court on page 328 stated:
uwe assume but do not decide that the original
New York separation judgment is still entitled to
enforcement.... We view as improvident, however, the order made herein punishing the defendant
for contempt when it appears that the New York
judgment contained a provision by implication that
the children would be available in this State for
visitation by the husband." (Emphasis added)
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Under the New York statutes a court may annul or
modify, retrospectively, alimony and child support
arrearages of a New York decree. 1
Where suit is brought for arrearages under a foreign
divorce decree, such as the one in the instant case, the New
York courts give full faith and credit to the decree and
would not sustain any asserted defense of violation of
visitation privileges.
In Sterns vs. Stevens, 204 NYS 2d 623, 11 AD 2d 726
(App. Div., 1960), the court on page 625 stated:
((The Florida decree did not require the plaintiff to keep and maintain the daughter in the State
of New York; nor was the defendant's obligation
to support the daughter therein conditioned upon
plaintiff's maintenance of the daughter within the
lMcKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 14, Domestic Relations
Law, Sees. 240 and 244 provide:
Section 240: "In any action or proceeding brought (1) to annul a
marriage or to declare the nullity of a joint marriage, or (2) for a separation, or (3) for a divorce, ... the court must give such direction, between
the parties, for the custody, care, education, and maintenance of any child
of the parties, as, in the court's discretion, justice require, ... Such direction may require the payment of a sum or sums of money either directly
to the wife or to third persons for goods or services furnished for such
child .... Upon the application of either the husband or the wife, or of
any other person or party having the care, custody, and control of such
child pursuant to such judgment or order, . . . the court may annul or
modify any such direction.

Section 244: "Where the husband in an action for divorce, separation or
annulment . . . makes default in paying any sum of money as required
by the judgment or order directing the payment thereof, the court in its
discretion may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the
amount of such arrears, or for such part thereof as justice requires, having
a regard to the circumstances of the respective parties. . . ." (Emphasis
added)
See also, VanDusen vs. VanDusen, 17 NYS 2d 96, 258 App. Div. 1020 (1940);
Eisinger vs. Eisinger, 26 NYS 2d 22, 261 App. Div. 1031 (1941).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State of New York. If plaintiff has violated the
terms of the decree with respect to the defendant's
rights of visitation, the remedy lies in a motion to
amend said decree with respect to the provisions
requiring him to make payments for support. In
the absence of such a modification, the plaintiff's
conduct in maintaining the daughter in Canada
furnished no reason for defendant's release from his
obligation to support his daughter as directed by
said decree."
In Rosmini vs. Rosmini, 230 NYS 2d 319 (N.Y. City
Ct., 1962), the court on page 321 stated:
ttThe defendant in his answer alleges in substance and effect that plaintiff deprived him of his
rights of visitation as provided for in the divorce
decree by reason of the plaintiff's sojourn to California with their daughter for two years, and that
she thereby waived her rights to the accrued payments thereunder and should be estopped from
seeking same. The defendant also contends in his
affidavit in opposition that this was a violation of
his rights of visitation as set out in a separation
agreement made prior to the issuance of said divorce
decree, and that the terms and provisions of such
agreement were to remain in full force and effect
and to survive the entry of such subsequent decree
of divorce.
nHowever, as the plaintiff is not relying upon
the separation agreement and as the payments called
for by the decree are not conditioned upon defendant's right of visitation as allowed therein, and
as the divorce decree makes no reference whatever
to the separation agreement, the defense that there
was a violation of such right either under the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

separation agreement or the decree is insufficient as
a defense to the action.

ult generally appears that in cases of this character based upon foreign marital decrees that an
alleged breach thereof would not constitute a defense in an action brought in the courts of this
state for accrued alimony under the foreign decree
if the right to such payment has vested and that any
remedy based on such facts must be found in the
jurisdiction where the decree was rendered. Such
is the weight of authority in this jurisdiction."
(Citation of New York cases omitted).
The fact that alimony or child support arrearages
are protected by the full faith and credit clause 1 was recognized by this court in Westerfield vs. Coop, 6 Utah 2d 262,
311 P2d 787 ( 1957). In the Westerfield case full faith
and credit was given to past due installments of alimony
and support under a California divorce decree.
Under Alabama law, the child support payments,
pursuant to the decree of divorce between the parties,
become absolutely vested as they accrued and are not
subject to modification or reduction because of any violation of the defendant's visitation rights.
The Utah Courts are constitutionally compelled to
consider the accrued child support payments as vested
and final and give to them the same faith and credit uas
they have by law or usage in the courts of (Alabama) from
which they are taken." The trial court was correct in
giving judgment for the unpaid child support payments.
lSee also, Decree For Alimony In Installments As Within Full Faith And
Credit Provision, 157 A.LR. 170.
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POINT II
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PAST-DUE INSTALLMENTS OF CHILD SUPPORT ARE NOT
PROTECTED BY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE, THE VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S
VISITATION RIGHTS DOES NOT LEGALLY EXCUSE OR DISCHARGE HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY
ACCRUED CHILD SUPPORT.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the arguments set forth in Point I, with respect to the application
of the full faith and credit clause, completely dispose of
this particular case. However, even assuming, for purposes of argument, that the past-due installments of child
support are not protected by the full faith and credit
clause, the defendant's contention that the violation of
his visitation rights legally discharges or excuses his obligation to pay child support cannot be sustained.

Assuming that the Utah courts could ignore the
requirements of the full faith and credit clause, the defendant's duties of support would be determined by Utah

law.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, Section 77-61a-7, Utah Code Ann., provides:

rrchoice of Law.-Duties of support applicable
under this act are those imposed or imposable under
the laws of any state where the obligor was present
during the period for which support is sought. The
obligor is presumed to have been present in the
responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown."
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The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Baker vs.
Baker, 119 Utah 37, 224 P2d 192 ( 1950), rejected as a
defense to an action to recover past-due installments of
child support the fact that a husband's visitation rights
had been violated.
In the Baker case, as in this case, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to past-due
installments of child support because his visitation rights
had been violated and the children removed by the plaintiff to another jurisdiction without his permission. The
defendant, in his brief, admits that in the Baker case uthe
father failed in his attempt to assert as an excuse for evading his own social, moral and legal obligations, a technical
breach' by the mother of the visitation provisions when
she had moved the children to Oregon where were her
other children, relatives, and friends." (App. Br. 7)
(Emphasis added)
The defendant attempts to distinguish the Baker case
from the present one by asserting that in the Baker case
there was a ((technical breach" of the visitation rights;
whereas, by inference in this case, there was something
more.
In the Baker case the ((technical breach" of visitation
rights resulting in the plaintiff being held in contempt of
court for the removal of the children from the state of
Utah. However, notwithstanding this finding of contempt, the Court still held that the plaintiff was entitled
to the past-due installments of child support.
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It should be noted that in the Baker case the defendant's visitation rights were based on the divorce decree and still the asserted defense was rejected. In the
present case, the defendant's visitation rights are based on
a prior separation agreement not incorporated or even
referred to by the later divorce decree.
Since the Baker case is squarely against the defendant's
position, the defendant relies heavily on the case of Larsen
vs. Larscu, 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P2d 596 (1956), which
involved a completely different fact situation than the
one presented here.
In the Larseu case, the husband on two separate occasions had inquired of his former wife with respect to
whether or not she would require him to make the child
support payments in accordance with the court decree.
The evidence was clear that on both occasions the plaintiff had represented to the defendant that she would not
require him to make the payments and that the only thing
she wanted was for him to ustay out of her life."
The court on page 598 stated:
uwhere the father's failure to make such payments was induced by her representations or actions
and where as a result of such representations or
actions the father has been lulled into failing to
make such payments and into changing his position
which he would not have done but for such representations, and that as a result of such failure to pay
and change in his conditions it will cause him great
hardship and injustice if she is allowed to enforce
the payment of such back installments, she may be
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thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of
such back installments."
The plaintiff was estopped from recovering past child
support payments because of a ((representation to defendant that he would not be held accountable for the
support money." See, Hall vs. Hall, 7 Utah 2d 413, 417,
326 P2d 707 (1958).
Certainly there are no facts in this case from which
a court could find, nor does the defendant contend, that
the plaintiff represented in any way that she no longer
expected to ,receive the child support payments.
Most of the courts which have considered the specific
issue before the court in this case have held that a violation
of a husband's visitation rights does not prevent the recovery of past-due installments of child support.
In Zirkle vs. Zirkel, 202 Ind. 129, 172 NE 192
(1930), cited in the Baker case, the court on page 194
stated:
ccin the case under consideration, it must be
presumed that the order as to custody and support
of the child was made for the benefit of the child.
The child was and still is entitled to have the order
executed. The order has not been modified or set
aside ....
ccif the appellant, without the consent
court, or without right took the child out
state, that act did not give the appellee any
for refusing to make the weekly payments
the court had ordered."

of the
of the
reason
which
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The Baker case also cites in support of its decision
the following cases: Feinberg vs. Feinberg, 72 N.J. Eq.
810, 66 Ad. 610 (1907); Helmbold vs. Helmbold, 127
Misc. 761, 217 NYS 379 (1926); Scbweig vs. Scbweig,
122 App. Div. 787, 107 NYS 905 (1907); and Altschuler
vs. Altschuler, 246 App. Div. 749, 284 NYS 93 (1935.)
In the case of Kain vs. Kain, 318 P. 2d 955, 51 Wash.
2d 387 (1957), the Supreme Court of Washington stated
on page 956:
ult is a well established rule in this state that
liability for support-money payments is not contingent upon the continued, convenient exercise of
the right of visitation. The trial court did not have
the power to modify the decree as to supportmoney installments that accrued prior to the date
of the order modifying the decree of divorce."
Also, the cases of Lide vs. Lide, 201 Miss. 849, 30
So.2d 51 ( 1947), and Lotz vs. Lotz, 327 Mich. 577, 42
NW 2d 745 (1950), support the rule announced in the
Baker case.
POINT III
INTEREST ON PAST-DUE INSTALMENTS OF
CHILD SUPPORT ACCUMULATES UNTIL THE
ARREARAGES ARE PAID.
The installments of child support as they accrued
became final and vested. Therefore, the granting of interest on the arrear ages was proper.
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In McKay vs. McKay, 13 Utah 2d 187, 370 P2d 358
( 1962), the court stated on page 189:
t(The court also erred in refusing to grant interest on the accrued installments. As stated in
Larsen vs. Larsen 2 by this court: (It is the law in
this state that the right to installment payments
under a divorce decree vests upon the due date and
that interest should be allowed until the payment
is made.
2 Larsen

vs. Larsen, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P2d 421, p. 422.

Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
MERLIN 0. BAKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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